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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah 
Code Ann, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of any case 
transferred to it from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Plaintiff/Appellee, Trolley Square Associates, 
(hereinafter TSA) operated the Trolley Square specialty Mall in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Mall began to experience a decline where 
maintenance, cleanliness, lighting, security and other requisites 
began to deteriorate. Quality tenants in the mall began to leave 
and the space vacated was not filled. Traffic through the mall fell 
off drastically. As a result of declining business, the 
Defendant/Appellant Somebody's Mother, Inc. (hereinafter SMI) 
experienced a reduction in income to the degree it could not 
pay its expenses as they came due and began to accrue large 
arrearages in the rent it owed TSA. The first issue is: under these 
circumstances, where TSA, in an ongoing manner for a period of 
three or more years, told SMI that TSA did not want SMI to leave 
the mall; continually encouraged SMI to stay; TSI did not want 
another large space vacant; used SMI as an example of a quality 
tenant in the mall to entice other tenants to come into the mall 
and as a showpiece business to show potential investors; and 
continually led SMI to believe that the rent arrearage would be 
resolved by an agreement resulting in a payoff of rent arrearages 
substantially less than claimed, that SMI could afford to pay and 
still remain in business; is TSA then estopped from later failing 
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to so settle the matter with SMI and collect the full rent claimed? 
In addition, did the failure of TSA to clearly delegate managerial 
authority contribute to said estoppel? 
2. Was the lease prepared by TSA and signed by SMI 
sufficiently ambiguous as to when the lease began and what the 
actual term of said lease was so as to require to court to construe 
the lease to be for a three year term beginning on December 1, 
1980? 
3. Shortly after SMI opened its business in the mall, it 
requested permission from TSA to carry additional lines of 
merchandise that would have been competitive with an existing 
children's store, Trolley Children, and was denied permission to do 
so, being told that SMI would not be allowed to directly compete 
with another mall tenant. In about 1982 or 1983, TSA ignored SMI's 
request to not allow Kids Duds, a large children's store coming 
into the mall, to directly compete with identical merchandise to 
that of SMI. As a result, SMI suffered a drastic reduction in sales 
after Kids Duds began business. Under the circumstances, was this 
improper of TSA and did such conduct breach a duty to SMI that 
would contribute to the estoppel against TSA from collecting rent 
arrearages that its actions help create? 
4. Were the amounts and arrearages claimed by TSA as 
represented by its exhibits #51, 52, 53, and 54 disputed by SMI and 
did TSA provide sufficient foundation and authentication to justify 
the admittance of said exhibits? 
5. The individual Defendants and Appellants Mary Whitesides 
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and Elaine Nielson signed personal guarantees at the time they 
executed the lease dated September 3, 1980. Where the tenant stays 
beyond the term of said lease on a month to month basis, are the 
personal guarantees enforceable beyond the stated term of said 
lease? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC, 
There are no Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules and/or regulations which are determinative of the issues in 
this case, except that Rules 1002, 1003 and 1004, Utah Rules of 
Evidence are determinative of the issue in Point II hereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving The Plaintiffs/Appellees as lessors 
of space in Trolley Square, a Specialty mall in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, owned and operated at the times stated, by Plaintiffs. The 
corporate Defendant/Appellant, Somebody's Mother, Inc. was a 
corporation operating a quality Maternity and children's clothing 
business as a tenant and lessee in Trolley Square. The individual 
Defendants/Appellants were principals and officers of the 
corporation, operated the business and signed personal guarantees 
of the corporation's lease. SMI opened its shop in Trolley Square 
sometime in 1974 in a 400 square foot space, grew its business, 
moving into 1,000 square feet and finally moving into a space of 
2,500 square feet in 1980. The business grew steadily until 1982 
when business fell off and it went into arrears in rent payments 
owed TSA. After more than four years of trying to work out a 
satisfactory settlement of the arrearage matter, SMI moved out of 
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Trolley Square and TSA and TS1 sued to collect claimed rent 
arrearages. SMI claimed that TSA had enticed it to stay under 
circumstances when it would ordinarily have cut its losses and 
moved from TSA's mall, to its detriment and to the advantage of TSA 
and claimed TSA was estopped from pursuing the full rent claimed. 
The individual Defendants/Appellants (hereinafter Whitesides and 
Nielson) claimed the term of the lease was three years beginning 
December 1, 1980 and not the three years, ten and one-half months 
claimed by TSA beginning February 15, 1981. Nielson and Whitesides 
also claimed the personal guarantees they signed in support of said 
lease are not enforceable beyond the term of the lease. SMI also 
claimed TS1 had damaged its business and inventory in the amount of 
$62,000 by reason of construction dust, dirt and debris and 
interference with its business in its arbitrary and uncoordinated 
demolition and remodeling of Trolley Square after it acquired said 
mall. SMI also claimed additional damage of $38,000 in additional 
money Nielson and Whitesides were required to put into the business 
to allow it to pay its expenses during the time TS1 had the mall. 
After a bifurcated four day bench trial before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis, the Court awarded TSA Judgement against SMI, 
Nielson and Whitesides in the amount of $115,840.70 and attorney's 
fees of $9,195 and awarded SMI Judgement against TS1 in the amount 
of $62,000.00 and no attorneys's fees. 
Statement of Facts 
1. SMI first opened a small store of about 400 square feet 
in the northwest side of Trolley Square in late 1973 or early 1974. 
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About four years later the store expanded to a second location of 
about 1,000 square feet in the southwest corner of the mall. The 
business originally was almost exclusively quality maternity wear. 
(TR. Vol II, P. 5, L 1 - P. 6,L 25) (The transcript erroneously 
shows the date as 1983 rather than 1973.) Lease paragraph 7.03. 
Competition. States: 
"Tenant shall not directly or indirectly engage in any 
similar or competing business within a radius of one 
fourth (1/4) mile from the outside boundary of the 
shopping center. Tenant shall not perform any acts or 
carry on any practices which may injure the building or 
be a nuisance or menace to other tenants in the shopping 
center." 
(Exhibit #42, P. 15) 
2. When the store was first opened SMI attempted to add some 
children's wear but an existing children's store in the mall 
(Trolley Children) objected and mall management would not allow SMI 
to compete with an existing tenant by selling the same type of 
merchandise. (TR. Vol II, p. 7, L.l - 14) 
3. SMI's business was increasingly successful for the first 
eight years going from gross revenues of approximately $50,000 in 
1974 to over $363,000 in 1982. (Exhibit 18) 
4. In late summer of 1980, while SMI was in its second 
location it decided that it would be advantageous to expand a 
modest amount and SMI expressed an interest in acquiring space 
approximately 500 square feet larger than that presently occupied. 
Nielson and Whitesides spoke to David Fairbourne (hereinafter 
Fairbourne), who was then general manager of the mall, about such 
prospects. They were told that TSA had plans to build a hotel in 
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about two years on part of the mall property and that SMI's 
existing space would be a part of the hotel lobby. Therefore it 
would work well for all concerned if SMI would relocate. (TR Vol 
II, p. 8, L 17 - p. 11, L 13) 
5. TSA had recently closed a business known as Trolley Drug, 
owned by Wallace Wright (hereinafter, Wright) and some other 
partners in TSA. The former drugstore space was to be partitioned 
and TSA wanted SMI to take the larger space of approximately 2,500 
square feet. SMI was unsure such a large space was desirable, they 
had only wanted 1,500 square feet and the larger area would take a 
substantially increased amount of inventory and fixturing to 
operate properly and would have to generate substantially more 
revenue to pay the increased costs involved, including a more than 
doubling of the rent. TSA represented that there would be no 
problems because the 300 room hotel would generate greatly 
increased traffic through the mall and the business of SMI would 
increase accordingly. (Fairbourne, TR Vol IV, p. 76, L 3 - p. 77, 
L 2) Relying on those representations SMI agreed to move to the 
larger space. (TR Vol II, p. 13, L 1 - L 19) 
6. Fairbourne, who was manager at the mall from June, 1978 
until March, 1982, presented the standard lease then in use to 
Nielson. (TR Vol IV, p. 67, L 14 - L 20; p. 69, L 4 - 5) Fairbourne 
was involved in drafting the lease on behalf of TSA. (TR Vol IV, p. 
69, L 4 - L 5) Nielson had reviewed the two earlier leases and 
remembers being told this third lease was like the other two and 
therefore did not submit it to legal counsel. (TR Vol III, p. 30, 
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L 9 - L 18) Whitesides did not read this last lease. (TR Vol III, 
p. 85, L 15 - L 18) [In an attempt to eliminate unnecessary 
repetitive testimony, Defendant's counsel requested the court to 
allow Whitesides, who had been present during all of Nielson's 
testimony, to testify that she heard said testimony, and if asked 
the same questions, would corroborate the answers given. The Court 
allowed Whitesides to proceed in that manner. (TR Vol III, p.62, L 
12 _ p. 63, L 19) Therefore Whitesides should be considered to 
corroborate, and be an additional witness to, all of Nielson's 
testimony.] Fairbourne does not remember discussing any of the 
particulars of the lease with either Nielson or Whitesides. (TR Vol 
IV, p. 69, L 13 - p. 70, L 22) 
7. Nielson (and Whitesides) believed they were acquiring a 
three year lease for the new and vastly larger space. They were not 
told by Fairbourne or anyone else that the lease was to be for any 
longer term. Nielson (and Whitesides) intended to enter into a 
three year lease. (TR Vol II, p. 20, L 2 - L 17; Vol III, p 30, L 
19 - p. 31, L 11) 
8. The Lease (Exhibit 42) is a 56 page document, the first 
page of which is entitled "Lease Worksheet" at the top right of 
which appears the date 9-3-80. In the blank labeled " Lease Term" 
has been typewritten "3 Years". Annual Minimum Rent is stated to be 
$19,840 - first 24 months . . . $29,760 - last 12 months. Page 4 of 
said document at top center is titled "Lease Agreement" and is 
dated 3rd day of September, 1980. At the middle of the page is a 
blank labeled "Lease Term" in which is entered "Three Years (3)" 
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and boilerplate stating "consecutive full lease years, (plus a 
partial lease year, if any, prior to the first full lease year)11 
Reference is made to (Sec. 3.03 and 3.04). Below the lease term is 
stated the Minimum Annual Rental: Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred 
Forty*. The referenced asterisk states "* First 24 Months . . . 
Last 12 Months -$29,760.00". Lease Paragraph 3.03. Term. States -
The term of this Lease shall begin as of the date that 
Landlord notifies Tenant that Landlord's work in the 
Premises as described in Exhibit "B" has been completed, or on 
the day Tenant occupies the Premises, whichever occurs first. 
Certification of the architect by whom the final plans and 
specifications were prepared that the Landlord's work in the 
Premises has been completed in accordance with Exhibit "B" 
shall be conclusive and binding upon the parties hereto. 
The term of this Lease shall end on the last day of the final 
lease year as specified in Article I hereof, unless sooner 
terminated as hereinafter provided. If the term hereof has not 
commenced within thirty-six (36) months from the date of 
Lease Agreement set forth in Article I, Landlord may terminate 
this Lease Agreement by written notice to Tenant. If the term 
has not commenced within five (5) years from the date set 
forth in Article I, this Lease Agreement shall automatically 
terminate. 
The third sentence of the above paragraph 3.03 above states 
that the term of the lease ends on the last day of the final lease 
year "as specified in Article I hereof". Article I does not state 
when the "final lease year" is! (p. 4 & 5 Ex. 42, See Addendum p. 
1 ) 
Paragraph 3.04. Lease Year Defined. States: 
The term "lease year" as used herein shall mean a period of 
twelve (12) consecutive full calendar (sic) months commencing 
on the first day of January of each year during the term 
hereof. The first lease year shall begin on the date of 
commencement of the term hereof if such date of commencement 
shall occur on the first day of January; if not, then the 
first lease year shall commence upon the first day of January 
next following the date of commencement of the term hereof. 
Each succeeding lease year shall commence upon the anniversary 
date of the first lease year. Any portion of the term hereof 
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prior to commencement of the first lease year shall be deemed 
a "partial lease year"; any reference in this lease to "lease 
year" shall be construed to mean lease year or partial lease 
year, whichever is applicable under the circumstances. 
Paragraph 28.20. Commencement of Lease, is found on page 43 of 
Exhibit 42 and states: 
This lease shall commence and be in full effect when tenant 
opens for business or December 1, 1980, whichever occurs 
first. The commencement of this lease shall make null and void 
that lease between Somebody's Mother, Inc. and Trolley Square 
Associates date may 9, 1977 
There is a line drawn up from the word December and printed is 
"February 15, 1981" the letters M.W. and WW appear next thereto, 
all done in black ink. 
Also on page 43 of the exhibit is Paragraph 28.21. Partial 
Lease Year., which states: 
Any additional months of occupancy due to partial lease year 
shall be charged rent at the rate of $8.00 per square foot 
prior to the last 12 months of occupancy, or the calendar year 
1983. 
The number three has been overwritten with a 4 and letters 
M.W. and another rather illegible mark made next thereto, all in 
black ink. (Page 43 of Ex. 42 is attached as Addendum p. 3 ) 
9. Nielson testified that she understood and intended when 
the lease was signed on or about September 3, 1980, that the lease 
was to be for a term of three years and not a term of Three years 
plus ten and one-half months. She also stated that there were no 
negotiations with her about altering the language in the above 
mentioned paragraphs 28.20 and 28.21 and that she did not review 
said paragraphs or initial them. (TR Vol II, p. 17, L 8 - p. 20, L 
17; TR Vol III, p. 30, L 19 - p. 31, L 11) Whitesides testified 
13 
that she did not read this lease beyond the first page, that she 
understood the lease to be for a term of three years, that no one 
negotiated with her to extend the term of the lease by ten and one-
half months, and that she understood that the significance of her 
initialling paragraph 28,20 was that the store was not ready for 
occupancy on December 1, 1980. (TR Vol III, p. 85, L 18; p. 116, L 
21 - p. 118, L 12) Whitesides testified that her duty in operating 
the business of SMI was mainly as the buyer, who helped in the 
store by attending customers when she was not on buying trips. (TR 
Vol III, p. 64, L 9 - L 18) 
10. As above stated, the lease provided for rents payable at 
$8.00 per sguare foot for the first two years and $12.00 per square 
foot for the last year. Nielson (and Whitesides) testified that the 
justification given them by TSA for the 50% increase in rents the 
last year of the lease was that there would be a hotel in place by 
then and SMI would have the benefits of the increased traffic that 
would be generated by said hotel. SMI was shown pictures, artists 
renderings of the hotel and a newspaper article about the hotel. 
(Exhibits #6, #16 and #16A, copies of which are attached as 
Addendum pages 4, 8 and 9 . ) SMI's accountant, Harold Hill knew 
of the proposed hotel. (TR Vol III, p. 165, L 2 - L 5; TR Vol IV, 
p. 12, L 19 - p. 13, L 1) SMI was never told that the hotel was not 
coming in. (TR Vol II, p. 15, L 15 - p. 16, L16; TR Vol III, p. 
92, L 17 - L 22) 
11. Nielson and Whitesides each signed a personal guarantee 
to said lease. (Said guarantee is set forth in page 51 and 52 of 
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Ex. 42 and a copy thereof is attached beginning at page 10 of the 
Addendum hereto. Nielson and Whitesides understood the guarantee 
was in force for the term of the lease, or three years. 
(TR Vol II, p. 22, L 22 - p. 23, L 20) 
12. SMI occupied the new space and for a while business 
continued to grow, 1981 and 1982 were good years financially for 
SMI. (TR Vol II, p. 31, L 10 - L 15 and Ex. 18) About 1982 things 
changed for the worse. A company named Excel purchased an interest 
in the mall and Fairbourne, the previous manager for four years was 
replaced by Rich Haws (hereinafter Haws). Conditions at the mall 
changed, maintenance, cleanliness, lighting and security 
deteriorated. Haws was not accessible to tenants. Construction on 
the hotel did not begin. The number of customers through mall began 
to decline. (TR Vol II, p. 31, L 16 - p. 33, L 21; Christine Lee, TR 
Vol 11, p. 197, L 2 - 15; p. 128, L 6 - p. 199, L 12; Ex 13; Rich 
Robins: TR Vol II, p. 211, L 12 - p. 212, L 4; p. 213, L 5 - L 18; 
Management began to change frequently, TR Vol II p. 217, L 14 - L 
24; Harold Hill TR Vol III, p. 156, L 6 - p. 157, L 14; TR Vol IV, 
p. 47, L 6 - L 12; 
13. Conditions at the mall began to deteriorate. Jerrold 
Jensen, who with his wife operated the store, Pappagalo, testified 
that when they opened the business in the mall in 1980, there were 
many "quality" businesses there, but that many of them left and 
were not replaced, and their space stayed vacant; (TR Vol IV, p. 
60, L 7 - L 16) Conditions in the mall were good when Pappagalo 
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moved in, the mall was doing many promotions that brought customers 
into the mall, but that all changed drastically sometime in 1983 
causing a substantial falloff in business; (TR Vol IV, p. 53. L 15 -
p. 54, L 25); Jensen saw " mass exodus" of Tenants and made comment 
that mall looked like a "tomb"; (TR Vol IV, p. 59, L 9 - L 21); 
David Fairbourne testified that maintenance was not maintained and 
there were "fewer and fewer stores" (TR Vol IV, p. 73, L 5 - p. 74, 
L 11; p. 74, L 10 - p. 75, L 10), Fairbourne was manager of the 
mall from June 1978 to March 1982, (TR Vol IV, p. 67, L 14 _ L 
20). At the time Fairbourne left, the mall was 95% leased, which 
percentage substantially decreased after he left, (TR Vol IV, p. 
77, L 22 - p. 78, L 8.) Rick Bastion, comptroller at mall from 
August 1983 to May 1986 (TR Vol I, p. 165, L 10 - L 11), 
acknowledged that a great number of tenants were leaving and good 
quality tenants were not coming into the mall to replace them. (TR 
Vol I, p. 197, L 9 - L 12) Bastion also acknowledged the rent 
concessions were being given to attract tenants. (TR Vol I, p. 205, 
L 22 - p. 205, L 7) Christine Lee testified: that the mall vacancy 
rate increased from 1981 on; (TR Vol II, p. 196, L 17 - p. 197, L 
1) there were many temporary tenants; (TR Vol II, p. 205, L 14 - p. 
206, L 1) Lee's store, Solieado, submitted list of complaints to 
mall management; (see Exhibit 13, a copy attached beginning as page 
12 of the Addendum hereto). Rich Robins, manager of the mall from 
February 1972 until May 1978 visited mall on regular basis: (TR Vol 
II, p. 207, L 8 - L 14; p. 207, L 19 - p. 208, L 6) saw overall 
maintenance deteriorate, saw a lot of turnover in tenants, saw a 
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substantial number of vacancies appear and joked about taking his 
Trolley Square management experience off of his resume'. (TR Vol I, 
p. 209, L 5 - p. 11, Lll; p. 213, L 5 - L 18; p. 211, L 12 - P. 
212, L 4). Whitesides testified that tenants were leaving with 
"flea market" tenants coming into the mall and that about 131 
original tenants left the mall in 3 to 4 years: (TR Vol III, p. 74, 
L 1 - L 15; p. 78, L 20 - p. 79, L 8) that maintenance and 
cleanliness were not good, the health department was called several 
times about unsanitary garbage dumpsters, there were rats and poor 
lighting. (TR Vol III, p. 75, L 14 - p. 76, L 2) Harold Hill 
testified that before Excel came in, there began to be a higher 
turnover of tenants, mall was not kept up as well as before, the 
quality of tenants was going down and that "important" tenants had 
left. (TR Vol III, p. 150, L 10 - p. 151, L 13) 
14. Wright testified that the mall at the above time was 
clean, in good repair with all lights on: (TR Vol I, p. 60, L 14 -
L 24) that tenants were not leaving: TR Vol I, p. 52, L 12 - p. 54, 
L 7) 
15. The conditions in the mall with regard to cleanliness, 
maintenance, garbage removal, lighting and security had begun to 
deteriorate. Quality tenants were leaving and not being replaced. 
In mid 1982 TSA was involved of leasing space to Kid's Duds, a 
store that was going to sell merchandise that was in great part 
identical to SMI's. Kid's Duds representatives had been in SMI's 
store taking notes and had contacted sales representatives who 
dealt with SMI to obtain information about SMI's product lines and 
17 
merchandising and ultimately, copied a great deal thereof. (TR Vol 
II, p. 33, L 22 - p. 36, L 14; TR Vol II, p. 71, L 1 - p. 73, L 15; 
Harold Hill, TR Vol III, p. 160, L 3 - p. 161, L 4; Whitesides, TR 
Vol III, p. 114, L 2 - p. 116, L 7) SMI wrote a letter to Wright of 
TSA expressing the concern and requesting that such a tenant not be 
allowed into the mall. (Exhibit 4, a copy attached hereto beginning 
as page 20 in the Addendum hereto) SMI received no response to 
its letter about Kid's Duds. Kid's Duds came into the mall and in 
great measure, duplicated SMI's children's merchandise and SMI's 
revenues fell off substantially. Kid's Duds left the mall in the 
middle of the night about two years after it opened. Wright 
testified that TSA attempted to prevent other tenants from coming 
into the mall whose business would be unfairly competitive with 
existing tenants and who would harm existing tenants. (TR Vol I, p. 
77, L 5 - L 24) Lease paragraph 7.03 prohibits competition. 
(Exhibit #42, P.15, Supra) 
16. Beginning about mid 1982, SMI's revenues fell off to the 
degree that it was unable to pay all of its expenses and began to 
accrue a rent arrearage about the end of 1983. Excel had purchased 
an interest in the mall and when it came in Fairbourne left in 
March of 1982. Max Pinegar (hereinafter, Pinegar) became an 
employee of Excel about the time it purchased its interest in 
early 1982. At that time the mall was profitable but in about 
February of 1984 Pinegar became aware the mall was experiencing a 
negative cash flow of about $100,000 a month. (TR Vol I, p. 126, L 
6 - L 17; p. 131, L 3 - p. 132, L 1) Perry Soskin (hereinafter 
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Soskin) was manager of the mall until Pinegar came to the mall in 
February, 1984, when Pinegar assumed management as a replacement 
for Soskin. (TR Vol I, p. 123, L 18 - L 22) 
17. SMI had accrued a large rent arrearage but disputed the 
amount claimed by TSA was correct. (Pinegar, TR Vol I, p. 143, L 12 
- L15; Nielson, TR Vol II, p. 76, L 18 - p. 78, L 11; TR Vol III, 
p. 43, L 2 - p. 44, L 8) SMI wrote Exhibit 9 to Price Waterhouse 
re disputed amounts, (TR Vol II, p. 87, L 3 - L 9 ; Whitesides, TR 
Vol III, p. 88, L 12 - L 23 and p. 90, L 11 - p. 92, L 22) SMI was 
continuously attempting to resolve the arrearage matter. During 
Pinegar's management SMI had met with him and reached what was 
believed to be a settlement of the arrearage matter where SMI would 
pay between $12,000 and $15,000 plus two months rent. Nielson, 
Whitesides and Hill understood an agreement had been reached and 
sent a letter to Pinegar dated September 18, 1985.(Exhibit #8 a 
copy of which is attached as page # 24 to the Addendum hereto) TSA 
did not follow through and either admit or deny such an agreement 
had been reached. (Pinegar, TR Vol I, p. 144, L 6 - L 14; Nielson 
and Whitesides, TR Vol II, p. 78, L 21 - p. 79, L 8; Hill, TR Vol 
IV, p. 3 L 18 - p. 4, L 17) 
18. Negotiations were undertaken with Wright resulting in a 
verbal agreement and in the preparation of the documents included 
in Exhibit #14, which are a handwritten letter to Wright and an 
attached letter from Robert Gipson Esg, SMI's California attorney. 
(Exhibit 14 is attached hereto beginning with page # 25 of the 
Addendum hereto) SMI received no response to this letter and 
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agreement. (TR Vol II, p. 83, L 12 - p. 85, L 20; Whitesides, TR 
Vol III, p. 66, L 9 - p. 70, L 7) SMI prepared Exhibit 15, a 
letter sent to Mel Simon and Associates in a more or less final 
attempt to resolve the rent arrearage dispute. In this letter SMI 
disputes the correctness of TSA's arrearage figures. (TR Vol II, p. 
109, L 17 - p. 110, L 18) (A copy of Exhibit 15 is attached 
beginning at page 31 of the Addendum hereto). 
19. From the time the mall's traffic fell off and tenants 
began to leave the mall and SMI's rent arrearage began to accrue, 
SMI has consistently been encouraged to stay in the mall. 
Representations were always made that the problem would be able to 
be worked out to everyone's advantage. Pinegar did not recommend 
eviction because he did not want to add a "large vacant space . . 
. more vacant space . . . there was already considerable vacant 
space. (TR Vol I, p. 145, L 21 - p. 146, L 22) Pinegar encouraged 
SMI to make a proposal to settle the arrearage for less than owed 
because he did not want SMI's space vacant. (TR Vol I, p, 147, L 7 
- p. 148, L 9) Pinegar never told SMI to pay up its rent or get 
out. (TR Vol I, p. 145, L 18 & 19) Pinegar thought a beneficial 
settlement could be worked out and the parties were trying to 
implement one. (TR Vol I, p. 156, L 18 - L 23) Management took the 
position after discussion of the matter that it was better to leave 
SMI in its space and work out a settlement than to have the space 
vacant. (TR Vol I, p. 157, L 15 - L 24) The letter to tenants 
represented by Exhibit 6 from Gary Sabin and Pinegar was intended 
to inform tenants of future plans of the mall and to encourage 
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tenants to stay, because tenants were leaving. (TR Vol I, p. 158, 
L 22 - p. 160, L 25) (Exhibit 6 is attached, the first page of 
which is page # 4 of the Addendum hereto) Rick Bastion testified 
that SMI was encouraged to stay because it was a quality tenant 
that the mall did not want to lose. (TR Vol I, p. 197, L 22 - p. 
198, L 7) Nielson testified that SMI did not leave the mall when 
other tenants were beginning to leave because management told SMI 
that it did not want any other vacancies, that the mall needed SMI, 
and that things could be worked out to the satisfaction of both 
parties. (TR Vol II, p.79, L 16 - L 25)[There was an objection to 
this testimony on the grounds of foundation and responsiveness, 
which objection was incorrectly sustained.] Nielson testified that 
SMI and TSA, specifically, Wright, negotiated a settlement of the 
arrearage matter providing that SMI would pay six percent of SMI's 
sales during the period when rent was not being paid, which 
percentage was calculated to be $32,768.16 and after the proposal 
was reduced to writing by SMI Wright failed to respond in writing 
and verbally reneged on the agreement adding terms that had not 
been earlier negotiated. (See Exhibit 14 included herein beginning 
on page 25 of the Addendum hereto) (TR Vol II, p. 84, L 19 - p. 
86, L 15) Whitesides testified that she had two meetings with 
Wright at which an agreement was reached that SMI would pay six 
percent of SMI's sales to settle the rent arrearage matter, and 
based upon Wright's verbal agreement a writing was prepared by 
SMI's California attorney, Robert Gipson, sent to Wright who failed 
to return it, but came into the SMI store and said "no". SMI then 
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went to Mel Simon and again reached a verbal agreement to which 
Wright would not consent. (TR Vol III, p. 66, L 2 - p. 67, L 25) 
Whitesides testified that if SMI had been told early on that it 
would have been expected to pay the full rent accruing, the store 
would have been closed. She also testified that based upon her 
dealings with TSA management, the first time she became convinced 
that the rent accrual problem could not be worked out to the 
satisfaction of both parties was in May of 1987 (the month SMI left 
the mall) (TR Vol III, p. 71, L 16 - p. 72, L 23) Hill testified 
that during SMI's business decline, it was being encouraged to stay 
by TSA who consistently represented that a solution could be found 
where SMI would pay an affordable arrearage and acquire a new rent 
base that would be more palatable to SMI. (TR Vol IV, p. 6, L 24 -
p. 7, L 16) 
20. Wright testified that Nielson and Whitesides were good 
business persons, that they ran a sound business, and would not 
state why he thought they would stay in a situation where unpaid 
rent was accruing for as long as they did. (TR Vol I, p. 45, L 6 -
L 24) Wright testified that the hotel was part of a long range plan 
and was not anticipated during the time frame of the last SMI 
lease and that the hotel was never advertised as imminent. (TR Vol 
I, p. 47, L 14 - p. 48, L 2) Wright testified that SMI never 
challenged the correctness of the amounts claimed as arrearages. 
(TR Vol I, p. 72, L 7 - p.73, L 12) Wright testified that during 
the time Equilease was there, maintenance, cleanliness, lighting 
and the state of repair were all good. (TR Vol I, P. 60, L 14 - L 
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24) He also testified that from 1980 to 1986 traffic through the 
mall was constantly increasing and that there was a constant 
increase in sales, and that the mall defaulted on its loan 
obligation because his Great Salt Lake investment had been flooded 
out and he could no longer afford to subsidize the mall. (TR Vol I, 
P 63, L 25 - P 64, L 25) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I WHERE TSA: MADE REPRESENTATIONS THAT THE RENT 
ARREARAGE PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED TO THE MUTUAL 
BENEFIT OF BOTH PARTIES; ENCOURAGED SMI NOT TO 
LEAVE THE MALL; AND USED SMI'S CONTINUED 
PRESENCE IN THE MALL TO TSA'S BENEFIT, TSA IS 
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THE FULL CLAIMED RENT 
ARREARAGE. 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 51, 
52 AND 53 WHICH WERE ADMITTED IN SPITE OF THERE 
HAVING BEEN INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AND BEING IN 
VIOLATION OF RULE OF EVIDENCE #1002 REQUIREMENT 
OF ORIGINAL. 
POINT III THE LANGUAGE OF THE LEASE IS SO AMBIGUOUS AND 
CONFUSING ABOUT WHEN THE LEASE BEGINS AND WHAT 
THE ACTUAL TERM OF THE LEASE IS TO BE, THAT 
THE COURT MUST CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT 
OF SMI THAT THE LEASE BE FOR A TERM OF THREE 
YEARS AND SO FIND. 
POINT IV THE PERSONAL GUARANTY SIGNED BY NIELSON AND 
WHITESIDES IS ENFORCEABLE ONLY DURING THE 
THREE YEAR TERM OF THE LEASE FOR WHICH IT IS 
NEGOTIATED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I WHERE TSA: MADE REPRESENTATIONS THAT THE 
RENT ARREARAGE PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED TO 
THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH PARTIES; 
ENCOURAGED SMI NOT TO LEAVE THE MALL; AND 
USED SMI'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE MALL 
TO TSA'S BENEFIT, TSA IS ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING THE FULL CLAIMED RENT ARREARAGE. 
21. As has been stated in paragraphs 12-16 above, conditions 
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at the mall had deteriorated to the point that customer traffic to 
the mall was decreasing. "Quality" tenants were leaving. TSA was 
not doing promotional advertising that would bring customers into 
the mall. The mall was beginning to look deserted. As a result of 
the tenant loss TSA had leased space to a business named "Kid's 
Duds" that intended to directly compete with SMI by selling the 
same lines of merchandise to the same customers. This was a 
violation of a course of conduct established by TSA when SMI first 
entered the mall. Allowing Kid's Duds into the mall also 
constituted a violation of lease paragraph 7.03, by allowing a 
tenant to enter the mall and perform acts or carry on practices 
which constituted a nuisance or menace to SMI's business. SMI was 
damaged thereby in that the market dilution of two similar 
businesses caused a reduction of revenue for SMI. 
22. Kid's Duds was in the mall about two years and then left 
in the middle of the night. Additional reduction in SMI's revenues 
were caused by the continued reduction of traffic through the mall. 
The resultant reduction of revenue reached against where SMI could 
not pay for the increased inventory it had purchased to fill the 
new and larger space to which it had moved, as well as its other 
business expenses. SMI disputed the correctness of the rents 
claimed by TSA as due and began not to pay the full rental to TSA, 
sometime in late 1983. Other businesses in the mall closed their 
stores and left the mall under such circumstances. SMI had been 
convinced to move to new larger space based on TSA's 
representations that a hotel would be built in the mall, the lobby 
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thereof occupying the 1,000 square foot space from which SMI had 
moved. The hotel, which was to have been in place in 1983 had not 
been begun. The increased traffic the hotel was to have brought 
was not there. The mall, which had been profitable when Exel came 
in in 1982, was experiencing negative cashflow of approximately 
$100,000 a month in February 1984 when Pinegar became mall manager, 
as stated in paragraph 16 above. Pinegar and SMI began discussions 
of how to resolve the claimed arrearage. These discussions were 
along the lines of SMI paying an agreed upon amount to TSA in 
satisfaction of the arrearage. SMI believed it had struck an 
agreement to resolve the arrearage for between $12,000 and $15,000, 
as set forth in paragraph 17 above. SMI sent a letter confirming 
that agreement and received no reply thereto. Negotiations were 
undertaken with Wright in which a verbal agreement was reached with 
Wright to pay a settlement amount of 6 percent of SMI's proceeds 
during the arrearage period, or $32,763.18. This agreement was 
reduced to writing and submitting to Wright, who didn't respond in 
writing, but verbally repudiated the agreement. The facts 
regarding this are set forth in paragraphs 17 and 18 above. 
23. In the context of the falling traffic through the mall, 
the flight of tenants, the accruing rent arrearage of SMI and the 
negotiations on settlement of the arrearage dispute, SMI was being 
encouraged to stay in the mall. TSA did not want to see another 
"quality" tenant leave the mall and leave behind a 2,500 square 
foot vacant space. The mall already had considerable vacant space, 
it did not want to add more. The mall was hemorrhaging tenants and 
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was using SMI as an example of the kind of quality tenants the mall 
had and as an enticement to convince new tenants to come into the 
mall. Mall management had discussed the matter and had taken the 
position that it was in the mall's best interest to leave SMI in 
its space and work out a settlement than to have the SMI space 
vacant. The settlement envisioned by TSA was that an agreement 
would be reached, whereby SMI would pay an amount less than that 
claimed by TSA to resolve the arrearage matter. Nielson was told 
by TSA that the mall needed SMI, that TSA did not want any other 
vacancies, and that things could be worked out to the satisfaction 
of both parties. Whitesides testified that based on her dealings 
with TSA, she was convinced the arrearage problem could be worked 
out until SMI left the mall in May 1987. Hill testified that 
during the time SMI was accruing a rent arrearage, SMI was 
consistently being told by TSA that an affordable solution would be 
worked out. Whitesides also stated that if she had believed that 
the rent arrearage matter would not have been able to have been 
resolved and that if SMI would have been expected to pay all rents 
claimed to have been incurred, the business would have been closed. 
The facts substantiating the above are set forth in paragraph 19, 
above. 
24. Wright testified, as set forth in paragraph 20, above, 
that Nielson and Whitesides were good business persons and ran a 
sound and successful business. Wright would not state why he 
thought Nielson and Whitesides would endure an untenable situation 
as they did. A reasonable explanation of why SMI did not close its 
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store and leave the mall when business fell off to the point of 
negative cashflow, is that TSA, its managers, agents and principals 
were making express or implied representations to the effect that 
if SMI stayed in its existing space in the mall, the parties would 
reach a settlement agreement affordable to SMI in an amount less 
than the full arrearage claimed • SMI acted on these 
representations and did not leave the mall. SMI continued to 
occupy its 2,500 square foot space. TSI was able to SMI as an 
example of a "quality" tenant in the mall. SMI showed potential 
investors through the SMI store. Now, where TSA would repudiate 
the representations that convinced SMI to stay in the mall when 
good business sense would have called for minimizing its losses by 
closing the store and leaving the mall, TSA must be estopped from 
claiming the right to collect the full arrearage claimed. The 
weight of the evidence as marshaled in the foregoing paragraphs, is 
substantially in favor of SMI. 
25. The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of 
public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its 
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, 
representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they 
were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. (Am Jur 2d, 
Estoppel and Waiver §28) The doctrine of equitable estoppel, which 
is founded upon good faith, is designed to prevent injustice by 
barring a party, under special circumstances, from taking a 
position contrary to his prior acts, admissions, representations, 
or silence. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. 
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Co., 251 La. 445 445, 205 So 2d 35 (La 1967) For a period of time 
going on four years, TSA, through its agents and principals, 
represented expressly or impliedly to SMI that the rental arrearage 
claim would be settled by an agreement whereby SMI would pay an 
amount substantially less than claimed. These representations were 
made expressly or impliedly to convince SMI to stay in the mall 
when business would not justify remaining. TSA continually enticed 
SMI to stay in the mall, be a model "quality" tenant, to be used as 
a showpiece tenant to help TSA attract other tenants to the mall 
during its decline. It was a definite advantage to TSA not to have 
another vacant 2,500 square foot space to add to the mall's 
"tomblike" appearance. The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel 
is a descendant of the ancient equity doctrine that if a 
representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, 
the person who made the representation must make the representation 
good if knew or was bound to know it to be false. Thus, the 
requirements for the application of the doctrine are that the party 
to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; be must intend that 
his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party 
asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; 
the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and he 
must rely upon the conduct to his injury. Lentz v. McMahon 49 Cal 
3rd 393, 261 Cal Rptr 310, 777 P.2d 83 (Cal 1989) SMI knew it 
could not afford to pay the claimed arrearage as it was claimed to 
accrue. SMI disputed the correctness of the amounts. SMI 
understood TSA to say if SMI remained in the mall, it would be able 
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to pay an amount substantially smaller than that claimed to satisfy 
the arrearage. When SMI left the mallf as a result of a 
constructive eviction by Plaintiff TS1, TSA then sued for a claimed 
arrearage of $106,443,19, repudiating the representations made to 
SMI. 
26. TSA should be held to be estopped from claiming the full 
accrued amount. 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 51, 52 
AND 53 WHICH WERE ADMITTED IN SPITE OF THERE HAVING 
BEEN INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AND BEING IN VIOLATION 
OF RULE OF EVIDENCE #1002 REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINAL. 
27. TSA produced exhibits #51, 52 and 53 for the purpose of 
establishing the amount of claimed rent and other arrearages 
claimed to be owed by SMI. SMI objected in that it was not known 
who prepared them, or why they were prepared, and there was 
insufficient foundation shown for the admissibility of said 
exhibits. (TR Vol I, p. 43, L 2 - p. 44, L 7) Later, TSA's 
counsel attempted to lay further foundation for exhibits 51, 52 and 
53. Wright testified for fifteen pages of transcript to the effect 
that he had exhibits 51, 52 and 53 prepared by the accounting 
department of Mel Simon and Associates to show a summary of all of 
the rents due as they accrued from 12/83 through 12/86, and was 
supposedly prepared for computer accounts kept at Trolley Square. 
The exhibits were prepared by a Shirley Williams at Mel Simon and 
Associates who was not present at trial and from whom there was not 
even a supporting affidavit. This testimony is found at TR Vol I, 
p. 95, L 17 - P. 108, L 15. (Copies of which are included in the 
addendum hereto beginning at page 34 .) 
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28. The preparer of said exhibits was not present in Court to 
be examined about said exhibits. Wright could only say he had them 
prepared at his request, which shows they were clearly not kept in 
the ordinary course of business. It is abundantly clear that a 
computer printout of the account in question could have been 
provided. Rick Bastion testified that TSA had the capability of 
providing a computer printout providing great detail of a tenant 
account and that a printout would be a greater benefit than the 
said exhibits. (TR Vol I, P. 189, L 20 - P. 191, L 10) Bastion 
testified that one could not tell if the entries contained in 
exhibits 51, 52 and 53 were accurate without looking at the 
computer printout. (TR Vol I, P. 192, L 10 - L 15) 
29. An obvious error is discernible from merely comparing a 
lease provision to the said exhibits. The lease, exhibit 42, 
states on page 1 thereof, that the square footage of the space 
being leased is 2,480. Said lease states in paragraph 19.03, on 
page 29 thereof, that the tenant shall join the Merchant 
Association, shall pay assessments of no less than $.40 per square 
foot for the first 1,000 square feet of floor area, and $.36 per 
square foot for the next 1,500 square feet. The mathematics of 
those numbers yield an annual payment for Merchant Association dues 
of $932.80, which is set forth on page 1 of the lease. That amount 
due monthly is $77.73. The amount set forth on Exhibits 51, 52 and 
53 for "MA dues" , merchant association dues is $103.33, an 
overcharge of $25.60 per month. 
30. Rule 1002, Utah Ruled of Evidence, Requirement of 
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Original, states: 
To prove the content of a writing, recording or 
photograph, the original writing, recording or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise 
provided in these rules or by other rules adopted 
by the Supreme Court of the state or by statute. 
Rule 1003, Utah Rules of Evidence, Admission of Duplicates, allows 
a duplicate to be admissible to the extent of the original unless 
a question is raised as to the authenticity of the original. Rule 
1004, Utah Rules of Evidence states that the original is not 
required and other evidence of the contents of a writing is 
admissible if (1) originals are lost or destroyed; (2) original is 
not obtainable, (3) original in possession of opponent or (4) 
collateral matters. None of the four exceptions listed are 
applicable here. There was no attempt to introduce the computer 
record of the account or a copy, although one was already 
available. The "best evidence" rule has come to denote a 
requirement that the contents of an available document be proved by 
introduction of the document itself. Roods v. Roods 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). The Wyoming case of Harned v. Credit Ba. of Gillette 
513 P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1973) is exactly on point. There the Plaintiff 
attempted to prove an account and the amount due by using a summary 
prepared by an employee from actual account records. Harned 
differs from this case only in that the person who prepared the 
summary was in Court to testify. The Court there said: 
"The best evidence rule requires that the original or 
primary evidence of an obligation by produced, and no 
evidence which is secondary or substitutionary shall 
be received if the original evidence can be had. The 
terms of a document must be proved by production of the 
document itself in preference to evidence about the 
31 
document. Cooley v. Frank 68 Wyo 436, 235 P.2d 446, 450. 
See the discussions at 32A C.J.S. Evidence §777. p. 93, 
and 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence §448 p. 508. ...See discussion 
at 2 Jones on Evidence Best and Secondary Evidence, Ch 7, 
p. 83 (6th Ed) Here the summary sheet would have been 
admissible had the Plaintiff produced the original 
records in Court so that they were available to the 
Defendants for the purpose of cross examination. Boiling 
Co. v. Barrington Co. 398 S.W. 2d 28 at 31 (Mo App 1965); 
Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am. 303 F2d 39, 
97 A.L.R.2d 1136 Cert Den 371 U.S. 891, 83 S.Ct 186, 
9 L.Ed 125 (1962). There the Plaintiff's witness 
testified that although the original invoices were 
available, she did not review them, and no attempt was 
made to produce or explain the failure to produce the 
original invoices in Court." 
Here, as in Harned there was no attempt to produce the 
original computer records nor any explanation of the failure to 
produce them. The Plaintiff in Harned attempted to argue the 
summary was admissible as a business record, but the Court there 
said that argument had to fail because it was clear the exhibit was 
a summary of antecedent records and therefore was not made in the 
regular course of business at or near the time of the event. 
(Harned at p. 653) 
31. TSA could have obtained and attempted to use an existing 
computer generated history of the account in guestion. It attempts 
to use a summary prepared by a person who is not in Court to 
attempt to authenticate it. Exhibits 51, 52 and 53 are clearly 
inadmissible and the trial court erred in admitting them over SMI's 
objection. 
POINT III THE LANGUAGE OF THE LEASE IS SO AMBIGUOUS AND 
CONFUSING ABOUT WHEN THE LEASE BEGINS AND WHAT 
THE ACTUAL TERM OF THE LEASE IS TO BE, THAT 
THE COURT MUST CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF THE INTENT 
OF SMI THAT THE LEASE BE FOR A TERM OF THREE 
TEARS AND SO FIND. 
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32. The lease, (exhibit 42) on page 1, states the "Lease 
Term" to be 3 years. Page 4 of the lease, in Article I, states: 
Lease Term: Three years (3) consecutive full lease 
years, (plus a partial lease year, if any, prior to 
the first full lease year) (Sec. 3.03 and 3.04) 
The words "three years" and the number 3 are typed in. The rest of 
the language is preprinted. There is no explanation as to why Sec. 
3.03 and 3.04 are parenthetically included where the language 
appears. 
33. The "Minimun Annual Rental" set forth on page 4 of the 
lease is defined as being: "Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty* 
Dollars ($19,840.00) per annum, payable in twelve (12) equal 
monthly installments during each year. (Sec. 4.01) 
* First 24 months 
Last 12 months - $29,760.00". 
24 months and 12 months equals 36 months or 3 years. The obvious 
language on page 1 and 4 then of the lease seem to state clearly 
that the term of the lease is for 3 years, two years at $19,840.00 
per year and the third year at $29,760.00. 
34. The term of the lease becomes confusing and difficult to 
clearly understand when one looks at the language of lease 
paragraphs 3.03 and 3.04 which are set forth verbatim in paragraph 
8 hereinabove. According to lease paragraph 3.03, the term of the 
lease begins as of the date landlord notifies tenant that his work 
in the premises described in Ex. "B" has been completed or on the 
day the tenant occupies the premises. Exhibit "B" to the lease 
does not really describe any premises, it is a list of 
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responsibilities between landlord and tenant for such things as 
floor slabs and interior partitions and so forth without stating 
where they are located. 
35. Just after lease Exhibit flB" at page 46 of the lease is 
Exhibit "C" to the lease, starting at page 49 of the lease. Line 
5 thereof states "that there is an unexpired term hereunder of 
three (3) years. 
36. Paragraph 3.04 states in pertinent part (and we 
paraphrase) that the term "lease year" is a period of twelve full 
calendar months starting January first of each year. The first 
lease year is to begin on the day the lease term commences, if it 
commences on January first, if not then the first lease year is to 
commence on the January first after the commencement of the lease 
term, any part of the lease term not included in the first "lease 
term" is to be a "partial lease year", whichever is applicable 
under the circumstances. To the above is added paragraphs 28.20 
and 28.21, found on page 43 of the lease and not referenced in any 
of the foregoing lease language. Paragraphs 28.20 and 28.21 are 
set forth verbatim in paragraph 8 hereinabove. Paragraph 28.20 
adds additional language about when the term commences not found in 
lease paragraph 3.02, stating that the lease commences when tenant 
opens for business, or December 1, 1980, whichever occurs first. 
A line is drawn to the upper right from "December" and February 15, 
1981 is printed, along with the letters MW and WW. (Addendum P. 3) 
37. Lease paragraph 28.21 says any "additional months of 
occupancy due to a partial lease year shall be charged rent at the 
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rate of $8.00 per square foot prior to the last 12 months of 
occupancy, or the calendar year 1983. "The three has a "4" printed 
in ink over it." This appears very confusing when compared to the 
minimum annual rental set forth in Article I of the lease at page 
4, which says: The first 24 months rent is at $19,840/per annum 
and the last 12 months is $29,760.00. 
38. Nielson and Whitesides both testified that since they 
were told that this lease was just like the others they had signed, 
they didn't submit it to legal counsel for review. SMI's counsel 
in this case read the above provision on the order of ten times 
before grasping what the landlord was attempting to accomplish. It 
is submitted that the above language is confusing, internally 
inconsistent and ambiguous as to what the term of the lease is to 
be and when the lease is to begin. TSA prepared the lease. (Rick 
Bastion TR Vol I, P. 185, L 11- L21) If there is an ambiguity, the 
court must then look to extaneous evidence to see if the intent of 
the parties can be determined therefrom. If such a determination 
cannot be made, the ambiguous provision must then be construed 
against the party that drafted the agreement and in favor of the 
other. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric 798 P. 2d 582 (Utah App. 
1988). Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Ca. & Sur. 817 P.2d 341 (Utah 
App. 1991). Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford 772 P.2d 466 
(Utah App. 1989). Nielson and Whitesides each testified that it 
was their intent and understanding that they entered into a 3 year 
lease. The lease says it is a 3 year lease on page 1, page 4 and 
page 49, line 5. By way of example, if the interpretation urged by 
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TSA is given the lease, a 3 year lease — if the term began with 
tenant occupancy on January 2 — would result in a term of 3 years, 
364 days. In the instant case, TSA urges the Court to find there 
to be a lease term of three years, plus ten and one-half months, an 
increase of nearly one third over that intended by SMI. 
39. The term of the lease was intended to be three years by 
SMI and should be held to be so. Lease paragraph 28.20 adds a more 
specific starting date to the provision of lease paragraph 3.04, 
i.e. that of December 1, 1980. It is unclear that any other date 
was agreed to or bargained for so the term should begin December 1, 
1980. Therefore, the term of the lease should be from December 1, 
1980 to November 30, 1983, a term of 3 years. 
POINT IV THE PERSONAL GUARANTY SIGNED BY NIELSON AND 
WHITESIDES IS ENFORCEABLE ONLY DURING THE 
THREE YEAR TERM OF THE LEASE FOR WHICH IT IS 
NEGOTIATED. 
40. This issue appears to be one of first impression in Utah. 
Nielson and Whitesides signed a "guarantee of lease" which is 
Exhibit "D" to the lease, trial Exhibit #42, and is found on pages 
51 and 52 of the lease. (The guarantee of lease is included in the 
addendum hereto at page 10.) Nielson (and Whitesides) testified 
that it was their intent and understanding that SMI enter into a 
three year lease. (TR Vol II, P. 20, L 2 - L 17) Nielson also 
testified that she discussed the guarantee of the lease with Dave 
Fairborne, who presented the lease to her and that she understood 
the guarantee to be concurrent with the lease, for a three year 
term, and that she was agreeing to be bound thereunder for a three 
year term. (TR Vol II, P. 22, L 22 - P. 23, L 20; TR Vol II, P. 
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144, L 10 - P. 145, L 8; TR Vol III, P. 63, L 5 - L 15) 
41. The three year term of SMI's lease under Exhibit 42 
expired and there was no renewal of the lease, nor was a new lease 
entered into by the parties. When the lease term expired, SMI's 
tenancy became one on a month to month basis. (Paragraph 3.06, 
Exhibit 42). TSA could have reguired SMI to leave the premises on 
30 days notice and SMI could have left at will. The relationship 
between landlord and tenants changed in that the rights are no 
longer strictly defined by contract. The contract between the 
parties is ended for the most part except for the tenant's 
continuing obligation to pay rent. Some of the tenant's rights are 
now governed by landlord-tenant statutes. 
42. The guarantee of lease, (pp 51 and 52 of Exhibit 42) is 
a separate contract of guarantee entered into in favor of TSA, by 
Nielson and Whitesides, who are not parties to the lease between 
TSA and SMI. A contract of guarantee is strictly construed to 
limit liability of the guarantor. Westcor Co. Ltd. v. Pickering 
794 P.2d 154 (Ariz App 1990) citing Consolidated Roofing & Supply 
v. Grimm 140 Ariz 452, 682 P.2d 457 (Ariz App 1984). Westcor cites 
the case of Zero Foods Storage, Inc. v. Udell 163 So 2d 303 (Fla 
App 1964) as stating: 
It appears that there is a split of authority as to 
whether or not a guarantee not identified as a continuing 
one will carry over to an extended or renewal term, when 
the option is exercised by the action or inaction on the 
part of the lessee without the participation or consent 
of the guarantor. However, it appears that the better 
reasoning is contained in those authorities which hold 
that a guarantee of performance of a written lease for a 
specific term does not continue into a successive term... 
without the express terms to show that the lease was of 
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a continuing nature. Id. at 304 (emphasis added) 
The Westcor court found there were no express terms in the 
Westcor lease to indicate it was of a continuing nature with 
respect to a successive term, and refused to enforce the guarantee 
beyond the term of the lease. The case of Shirley v. Venaglia, 86 
N.M. 721, 527 P.2d 316 (1974) was a similar case in which the New 
Mexico Court, facing the guestion as one of first impression, 
recognized a split in authority but chose the better reasoned rule 
as stated in Zero Food Storage (supra). The issue before the 
Shirley Court involved an attempt by a lessor to hold guarantors 
liable for attorney's fees incurred in collecting hold over 
rentals. The Shirley Court states, "The guarantee agreement is a 
separate, distinct contract between guarantors and lessors and 
should be strictly construed." (Shirley, infra at p. 319) The 
Court recognizes 24 Am Jur, Guaranty §71,P. 158, which states: "A 
guarantor, like a surety, is a favorite of the law, and his 
liability is not to be extended by implication beyond the express 
limits or terms of the instrument, or its plain intent." The Court 
reasons that: "A strict construction of this guarantee agreement 
results in a limiting of the guarantor's liability to only the 
five-year tenancy and any costs arising therefrom. Thus, the 
agreement does not apply to the subseguent holdover tenancy." 
43. Other courts in similar situations have held guarantee 
agreements to be strictly construed. Pelligreen v. Century 
Furniture and Appliance 524 S.W2d 168 (Mo App 1975) involved a 
tenancy under a lease with an option to extend the lease. The 
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tenant held over but did not exercise the option. The Plaintiff 
attempted to collect hold over rentals from individual guarantors. 
In affirming the trial court's denial of recovery against 
guarantors, the Court said: "The liability of a guarantor is to be 
strictly according to the terms agreed upon, and a guarantor is 
bound only by the precise words of his contract, and no stretching 
or extension of terms can be indulged in order to hold the 
guarantor liable." Zoalin v. Layland 328 S.W.2d 718, 721 [2-5] 
(Mo App 1959). LeCray v. Atlanta Arts Alliance, Inc. 191 S.E.2d 572 
(Ga App 1972) involved a similar attempt to impose liability on 
guarantors after expiration of the term of the lease in support of 
which the guarantees were given. The Georgia Court of Appeals 
cited a code section and other applicable case law: "The contract 
of suretyship is one of strict law, and the surety's liability will 
not be extended by implication or interpretation. Code §103-103. 
Whether the contract be one of guaranty or suretyship, the rule of 
stricti juris is applicable to both. Poole v. Corker 15 Ga App 
622(3), 83 S.E. 1101. (Ga App. 1915). The undertaking of a surety 
being stricti juris, he cannot, in law or equity, be bound further 
or otherwise, than the very terms of his contract: ... Bethune v. 
Dozier 10 Ga 235. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and authority cited above, the Appellants' 
respectfully request the Court to grant the following relief: 
I. That this Court reverse, modify and/or invalidate the 
findings of the trial court set forth as findings no: 
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3. As not being consistent with evidence that the lease was 
represented to Defendants as being the same as previous leases and 
not warranting review, 
5. In that the confusing and ambiguous language of the lease 
requires construction that the term of the lease ended November 30, 
1983. 
6. That the tenant was on a month to month tenancy from 
December 1, 1983. 
7. That the lease had expired November 30, 1983 and the 
tenancy ended May 1987. 
8. That although the lease provided for $8.00 per square 
foot for the final 24 months, the hotel, which was a condition 
precedent to justify the increased rent had not occurred and the 
rate should have remained at $8.00. 
10. This finding should be stricken as the Estoppel 
certificate did not continue the lease in effect beyond its term. 
11. This finding should be stricken in that the estoppel 
certificates had no legal effect on expanding liability under the 
guarantee agreement. 
12. This finding should be stricken as being unsupported by 
the evidence. 
13 and 14. These findings should be modified to support an 
estoppel against TSA from claiming full rent accrual. 
16. This finding should be stricken in that the exhibits upon 
which it is based were inadmissible. 
19. This finding should be modified to reflect that SMI 
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remained in the mall based on representations made by TSA ^agents, 
managers and principals. 
20. This finding should be stricken as not accurately 
representing the conditions at the mall that TSA allowed to occur 
in violation of its duties under the lease. 
The conclusions of law should be revised, modified or stricken, 
consistent with the above. 
II. This Court should find TSA estopped from collecting its 
full claimed rent arrearages for the reasons set forth in 
Appellants' Point I. 
III. The Court should find TSA's exhibits #51, 52 and 53 to be 
inadmissible and improperly admitted into evidence and reverse any 
judgement based thereon for the reasons stated in Appellants' Point 
II. TSA had the burden of proving by a preponderance of competent 
evidence what, if any amounts were owed, which burden it failed to 
sustain. 
IV. The Court should find the terra of the lease to have been 
for three years beginning December 1, 1980 and ending November 30, 
1983 for the reasons stated in Appellants' Point III. 
V. The Court should hold the personal guarantee agreement 
signed by Nielson and Whitesides to be valid only during the term 
of the lease for which it was negotiated, for the reasons set forth 
in Appellants' Point IV. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1993. 
D. Kendall Perkins 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage pre-
paid a copy of the foregoing to E. Nordell Weeks, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 320 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street, 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT made t h i s 3rd d ^ y of September 
1980_/ by and be tween TROLLEY SQUARE ASSOCIATES, a P a r t n e r s h i p , whose 
a d d r e s s i s 199 T r o l l e y S q u a r e , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 , h e r e i n 
c a l l e d " L a n d l o r d " , and Somebody's Mother 
______
i 
h e r e i n c a l l e d " T e n a n t . " 
W I T N E S S E T H ; 
In C o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e r e n t s , c o v e n a n t s and a g r e e m e n t s 
h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h , t h e L a n d l o r d demise s and l e a s e s t o t h e T e n a n t , 
and t h e T e n a n t r e n t s from L a n d l o r d , t h e h e r e i n a f t e r d e s c r i b e d 
P r e m i s e s upon t h e f o l l o w i n g t e rms and c o n d i t i o n s : 
ARTICLE I 
FUNDAMENTAL LEASE PROVISIONS 
D a t e : 
L a n d l o r d : 
T e n a n t : 
T e n a n t ' s Trade 
Name: 
September 3, 1980 
T r o l l e y S q u a r e A s s o c i a t e s 
Somebody's Mother, Inc. 
Somebody's Mother (See E x h i b i t "A1 
L e a s e Term: Three Years 
( 3 ) c o n s e c u t i v e f u l l l e a s e 
y e a r s , ( p l u s a p a r t i a l l e a s e y e a r , 
i f any , p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t f u l l 
l e a s e y e a r ) (Sec . 3 . 0 3 and 3.04) 
Minimum Annual 
R e n t a l : Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty* 
Do J 1 a r .<; 
($ 19.840.00 ) p e r annum, p a y a b l e 
i n t w e l v e (12) e q u a l month ly 
i n s t a l l m e n t s d u r i n g each y e a r . (Sec. 
* First 24 months 
Last 12 months - $29,760.00 
4 . 0 1 ) 
3 / 1 2 / 7 9 
Percen tage 
R e n t a l : Six 
( fi %) 
p e r c e n t 
(Sec. 4.02) 
T e n a n t ' s 
I n i t i a l 
Share of 
Common 
Expenses : One and Seven One Hundredths po rccn t 
(1,07 *) (Sec. 11.01) 
Addresses 
for Notices: To Landlord: 
Trolley Square Associates 
199 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
To Tenant: 
At the Leased Premises o r 
Somebody's Mother, Inc. 
212 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
S e c u r i t y 
Depos i t : N/A 
Dollars 






Nine Hundred Thirty-Two and 80/100 
Dollars 
932,80 (Sec. 19.03) 
References in this Article I to other articles 
of this Lease are for convenience and desiqnate some of 
articles and sections thereof whore rcfor^ruws to the p 
Fundamental Lease Provisions appear. Each reference in 
to any of the Fundamental Lease Provisions contained in 
Article I shall be construed to incorporate all of the 
under each such Fundamental Lease Provision. In the event of any 
conflict between any Fundamental Lease Provision and the balance of 
the Lease, the latter shall control. 
and sections 
the o t h e r 
ir I i cuJ <\ r 
t h i s Lease 
th i s 
.eria:; provided 
- 2 - 3/12/79 
RIDER ., 
PAGE 2 ^ ' 
Section 28.20. Commencement of Lease. This lease shall/commence \ 
and be in full effect when tenant opens for business Qt; J)ecem/or-l-r^H&Q, fA^J 
whichever occurs first. The commencement of this lease shall make null ^ ^ 
and void that lease between Somebody's Mother, Inc. and Trolley Square 
Associates dated May 9, 1977 
Section 28.21. Partial Lease Year. Any additional months of 
occupancy due to partial lease year shall be charged rent at the rate 
of $8.00 per square foot prior to the last 12 months of occupancy, or 
the calendar year 198*. \. 
EXjfEL INTERFINANC1AL CORPORATION 
March 6, 1984 
v£?#ff 
Dear Tenant: 
We are taking this occasion to Inform you about some 
of the recent ,-devel opments .at Troll ey t Square* and to 
thank you for your continued efforts/and support. 
We share the 
during the pa 
of a 40 perce 
CorporatIon. 
generated som 
woui d I Ike to 
Investment of 
& Jennrette, 
with the sa 





st several> month 
nt Interest •In 
. A* recent, new 
e concern and • m 
allev late. ' The 
ferIng In Trolle 
'; of New 5 York 
e to EquII ease,* 
successfuI, Equ 
Interest In Tr 
move ahead wl 
ch * -you have .experienced 
s rel atl v e ^ t o the sale 
.Trol ley ,;J to ' Equ I I ease 
s artlcl e^about >the-'sa I e 
IsunderstandIng whIch we 
funding'of^a' particular 
y " by Donal.'dson,;'Luf kf n, 
C Jty,':has^npth I ng to'Vdo 
. Whether.' :j or *
 vnot.-; .that 
I lease has now purchased 
o! I ey \< and . p I ans . are 
th var lous'-areas of , new 
We have taken positive steps In the past to. Improve 
the Square and will continue to ' do so l.n:.the* future. 
Our objective , Is to prov 1 de'<* greaterrr.t'access ^ for 
customers to alI areas In the mal rf/'carbarn*'*; To 
open up many of these areas, we have ' \ . I nstal led -v.the 
two escalators (east and south'entrances) * at a'" cost 
of nearly $300,000. ,* Work Is underway Ton' both • level s 
near the east entrance to connect
 fthe':r,second bay to 
feed traffic Into the fourth bay.'*Dur I ng the 'past 
year, Improvements to the building. Including a new 
roof has required an Investment of approximately $1 
million dollars. Plans are also .
 sunderway ,to 
construct restrooms on the ground floor, which Is 
something the tenants have requested since 1973.' 
We are actively seeking leases to - compl Iment a 
tenant mix we feel Is Imperative for the Square—one 
that will more' fully serve the day-to-day' retaI I Ing 
needs of our "market whl I e <~ mat ntal nl ng '-the \ unique 
atmosphere that only Trol ley .Square can ; proy I deV^We 
are . presently • completing'* negot I at,l ons K>\on, ^ seyeral] 
large retail spaces on both levels wlthV^omer.regIonal 
and national tenants. V The\redeslgned J? open-market 
area will be enlarged to accommodate *• a ^superb'';*.,food 
court/food mart. It should also 'be'p.noted .that a 
number of the vacant spaces In Trolley are a result 
of new construction to connect the bays' and to open 
up new leasable space. 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
Trolley Square Tenants 
Page 2 
March 6, 1984 
We are excited about the new direction f or^Tr.olJey'^Square* 
This Center has long held an enviable posl tlon^aVone 'of ,>he 
most unusual and successful theme centers^ \ n/theV.natlon," and 
you have been an Integral part of' this-success].*-*'-Be assured 
that we value you and your busl ness and f^deslne ^.to v^work 











EXCEL INTERFINANCIAL CORPORATION 
Max L/ PInegar 
Senior Vice President 
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scgurity officer , who 
{$hc §aw him pocket an 
,. h part when in fact Ijc 
rt'When he left the store, the 
officer stopped him, but with-
out explaining her status as.a 
T&nsWesterri/ 
gO to $30 million and aflame, i^fa 
Giant Allied Corp. 
. r i H I i • ' • • • • : • ' •-. 
WSlMiR:^ reason foi^'ac-^'v " " ~ 
i 0 ^ - : * «Wl9c ensued, Mdjhe^/i*y PWl Sahm 
by Max Jarman 
Staff Writer " • ,? 
' New Yorkfs Equilease 
















(NYSE), has acquired > 40 Mr-
cent interest in Trolley 5quare 
and hasj plans to invest between 
CO nuihon and $30 million up-
grading the property and con-
ducting a 300 room hotel on 
_; A spokesman at Realty 
J*ndui8 Corp.. a consulting 
firm to Equilease, said the in-
terest was acquired from 
Prpyo's Excel Interfinancial 
^orp. for an undisclosed price 
Excel purchased a 4 percent in-
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TrolkySquare,/ft*/ */««,//,,
 Qn track 
^expected to i T - S t ^ . . • S S g A ^ t 0 » » < « > • 
*0*J « : n - /- W.^ •'• •« .TROLLEY page four 
^^m^^iSl^m^miand Driven site 
, oegm developing 4 328-unit, $22 
; million condominium project 
•* on the huxL.-;r.;.;!?::.;./-;^ ^ - • 
t j ^ f f onager for M c ^ a r ^ the : 
;:•; %;~?zdevelopment company also will 
, M ; : ; .• J*0* a. " ^ o t e ' ^ t r u c t i o n 
' f l ^H>; Joan with American West Mort-
*•:
 ;.^;y:;gage next, week, meaning 
;, ground breaking on the project 
^.should happen in, mid-March. V 
,,:Hedcchned to disclose the pur-' •':' 
I-. d^pricef»the<lriv^in. ' 
. The Highland Drivc-ln site 
B one of the last ..major prime 
residential development areas 
°" *•* east side. Broderson said 
the McKellar project will be 
avishly landscaped with Mill 
Creek flowing through the area 
to blend into the neighborhood 
. Broderson said the con-
TOg^^iSchulman- W l i S S m B S S B & ^ i ^ f^%ff^U^:svd worfc on a ^ ^ S S I S ^ S W ^ W ^ " 
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(continued from page one) 
crated by a national franchise 
that has yet to be named by 
Equilease. 
Additional plans" call for a 
complete facelift of the center, 
new parking structures, the ad-
dition of new retail space and 
the installation of a 40,000 
square foot food court, Schul-
,man said. 
Much of the interior retail 
space will be redesigned, Schul-
man said, adding leases will be 
renegotiated with tenants and a 
major marketing campaign for 
the center will be launched. • 
- The project will be "a major 
redevelopment and renovation 
of the property," Schulman 
said, adding Equilease was at-
tracted to .Trolley Square 
because it is "one of the key 
pieces of real estate in Salt Lake 
Gty." . , ,- ^ 
Equilease, which syndicates 
its equipment leases (which can 
Business license 
denied to body shop, 
include entire fleets of aircraft) 
into limited partnerships, also _ 
plans to syndicate its interest in 
TYolley Square. r r ^^^COde violat ions Cited 
A prospectus is Twng pres* * * x The Salt Lake County Com-
pared for a $6.4 million offering * ' mission has approved the denial 
that includes 65 limited partner-*** 7of a business license for J & R 
ships at $100,000 each. The of-
fering is being handled through 
the firm of Donaldson Lufkin 
and Jenerette, a New York in-
vestment banking firm with 
total assets in the $300 million 
range. •• -.- *V~ A -. -«-
. Body and Paint at 3480 So. 500 
W. The county fire department 
.inspected the business and 
determined it was not in com-
pliance with the Uniform 
Building Code or the National 
.^ Electrical Code. 
Shoplifting 
•v A r . : * (continued from page one) 
and was never Wought before 
the magistrate. The dentist later 
sued and won the $35,000. ~\* 
While- Skaggs was unsuc-
cessful before the top court with 
its arguments about the legality 
of the arrest — a subject court 
spokesman Chief Justice Gor-
don R. Hall dealt with in length 
— it did persuade the court to 




can have some serious 
gaps without property 
in place! 
You have your I.RA In place and vibfking. You 
~may elect to use your directed I.RA monies to^ 
• purchase your lot without sacrifice of the tax J_~ 
benefit. You have your investment portfolio >*%-' 
»geared for the proper return. Now consider this 
rare opportunity... 
FACT: Utah and St George provide the most 
desirable retirement locales in the nation. 
FACT: Now is the time for this investment buy. 
You assure your St George area lot, certain to 
> C 
r\ r\r^ r^rs i n+ex r\ \ / / ^ I I I I A 
-J 
dard much more favorable to 
Utah merchants. 
J
 r Skaggs cited a number of 
legal authorities supporting the 
actual malice standard, which 
»
J
 prompted the court itself to in-
. vestigate case law and find that 
the majority of courts adhere 
' to it. 
, . The new standard will likely 
limit punitive damage awards to 
flagrantly improper false 
imprisonments and give mer-
i chants more protection against 
'^shoplifters. , 
t" t jr Where the element of bad 
," .intent is lacking and the detain-
"ment is the result of a mere 
' mistake as to either identity of 
" the party or the propriety of an 
arrest or imprisonment, puni-
tive damages will now be 
-denied.
 t 
Z,^ While the court affirmed the 
$10,000 general damage award 
to the dentist, the case was sent 
back to re-try the issue .of 
- punitive damages using the new 





services f inn" ><*« 
*..».« r •• 
Wallace G. Bennett, who
 i 
for five years served as president ^ 
of Bennett Paint and Glass Co.*" * 
has joined with a number of J; 
local businessmen and his 
brother, Robert F. Bennett, to 
:e~TOwer prannea Tor i rouey oquaie 
jJtl 
^tetofy lJjt^^^r / ^ ^ ^ o 

EXHIBI'i "D 
GUARANTEE 01* LEASE 
WKLllEAS, a c e r t a i n Loane of ovon (Into hercwi Lh has been , o r 
w i l l b e , e x e c u t e d by and be tween TROLLEY SQUARE, a p a r t n e r s h i p , 
t h e r e i n r e f e r r e d t o a s " L a n d l o r d " and Somebody's Mother, Inc. 
' 
therein referred to as "Tenant," covering certain Premises in the 
City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and 
WHEREAS, the Landlord under said Lease requires as a condi-
tion to its execution of said Lease that the undersigned guarantee 
the full performance of the obligations of the Tenant under said 
Lease; and 
V7HEREAS, the undersigned is desirous that Landlord enter 
into said Lease with Tenant, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the execution of said 
Lease by Trolley Square as Landlord, the undors.i nned hereby uncondi-
tionally guarantees the full performance of each and all of the 
terns, covenants and conditions of said Lease to be kept and per-
formed by said Tenant, including the payment of al .1 rental?: and 
other charges to accrue thereunder. The undersigned further agrees 
as follows: 
1. That this covenant and agreement on its part shall 
continue in favor of the Landlord notwithstanding any extension, 
modification, or alterations of said Lease entered into by and 
between the parties thereto, or thvir successors ot; assians, or 
notwithstanding any assignment, of said Lease, with or without the 
consent of the Landlord, and no extension, modification, alteration 
or assignment of the above referred to Lease shall in any manner 
release or discharge the undersigned and it does hereby consent 
thereto. 
2. This Guarantee will continue unchanged by any bankruptcy, 
reorganization or insolvency of the Tenant or any successor or 
assignee thereof or by any disaffirmance or abandonment by a trustee 
of Tenant. 
3. Landlord may, without notice, assign this Guarantee of ^  
Lease in whole or in part and no assignment or transfer of the Lease 
shall operate to extinguish or diminish the liability of the under-
signed hereunder. 
4. The liability of the undersigned under this Guarantee 
of Lease shall be primary, and in any right of action which shall 
accrue to Landlord under the Lease, the Landlord may, at its option/ 
proceed against the undersigned without having commenced any action 
or having obtained any judgment against the Tenant. 
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5. To pay Landlord's reasonable al-tornoys' fees and al] 
costs and other c::p< -risus incjrrc! in any col NM-I ion or .iltoi.iplod 
collection or in any negotiation lelaUvo lo the oblig.il ion-, 
hereby guaranteed or endorsing this Guarantee ot Lease against the 
undersigned, individually and jointly. 
6. The undersigned hereby waives notice of any demand 
by the Landlord, as well as any notice of default in the payment 
of rent or any other amounts contained or reserved in the Lease. 
The use of the singular herein shall include the plural. 
'!' N obligation of two or more parties shall be joint and several. 
Trie terms and provisions of this Guarantee shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the respective successors and assigns 
of the parties herein named. 
IN WITNESS WHERLOF, the undersigned has caused this 
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Dear Wally, 
We are not sure that we need to remind you of our history at 
Trolley Square, yet we feel that it may be valuable for you to 
try and consider our feelings at this particular time. It is 
not just our special relationship with Trolley Square that has 
us concerned with the consideration of the opening of another 
childrenfs store in the Square, but how this possibility 
reflects on the attitude of the owners regarding all the 
tenants, not just a tenant like Somebodyfs Mother, Inc. that 
has been in Trolley Square for nine years. 
We began in the Square in a very small space with restrictions 
placed upon us because Trolley Children had been in the Square 
before us. We outlasted Trolley Children and the restrictions 
were dropped and since that time we have made many sacrifices, 
all toward one goal—to build a strong, viable business. We 
have taken minimal salaries, done much of our own work (such as 
laying a tile inlayed parquet floor), and reinvested all our 
profits back into our business. One year ago we took a big 
risk and expanded from a 1,000 sq. ft. space to a 2,500 sq. ft. 
space. We have increased our product line to include sizes 
7-14 (due to customer request) and expanded our shoe and toy 
inventory greatly. We have invested a great deal of time and 
money in fixturing, awnings, and in store development only to 
find out one year later that another children's store, almost 
as large as our own, is about to sign a lease in Trolley 
Square. 
2 
This brings up many important questions 1n nur minds. 
course, the primary question is "How could you do it in uu 
We realize that you expect it to fulfill your immediate need tu 
lease space in the Square but we cannot help but feel that 
is crises-oriented and is not a complete consideratio 
whole picture, especially the long-range one. 
(1) The Salt Lake Children's Market is Saturated. Since 
we have been in business the number of childrens' 
stores in the. Valley have multiplied, Just in the 
past year and one-half Brown-Eyed Susan, The Younger 
Generation and a number of shops in Crossroads, ZCMI 
and other small malls have all opened within relative 
proximity. Women's Wear Daily, the primary women's 
retailing publication, did a cover story on the Salt 
Lake Market and stressed that the market has de-
veloped ten years aheadof the population. This is 
extremely accurate for the Children's Market mainly 
because everyone keeps counting children and not 
indexing it according to the specialty market possi-
bilities. Salt Lake City already has more Children's 
stores than large metropolitan areas such as New York 
andLos Angeles (this is an accurate, not an inflated 
estimate). 
(2) The Children's Market is a Specialty Market. Salt 
Lake is often seen as a Mecca for a business catering 
to children but this is inaccurate. While there are 
many children in the state per capita, generally 
the large families that help comprise these figures 
are seldom the clietele of such businesses. These 
people tend to shop at large discount stores. Our 
best customers are career women with one or two 
children and those kind of women are less plentiful 
than in many metropolitan areas. 
The Children's Market is not the same as the Women's 
Market. While a woman thinks nothing of investing 
$100.00 for a single dress, it considered "out-
rageous" for a dress for a child. This is a highly 
competitive market, not unlike the women's market, 
yet the resistance is extremely higher. 
3 
Considering the above factors we can see no benefits, what-
soever, for us in this transaction but we cannot forsee any 
benefit for Trolley Square either. One of our major sales 
representatives, Emily Martin (from whom we were imformed about 
Trolley's intensions to open a new children's store) expressed 
her disbelief that the Trolley Square owners would, at the same 
time, display such disloyalty and such a lack of awareness 
about this particular market. Her interest in the problem also 
highlights another point—that it is clearly "Kid's Duds" 
intension to duplicate our merchandise. We have spoken with 
several of our other representatives and they too have men-
tioned having contact with the "Kid's Duds" owners. One after 
another, our representatives expressed dismay at this un-
necessary and unfair duplication of merchandise. 
We have also spoken with many of the merchants within Trolley 
Square and far beyond mere sympathy,.there is an alarming sense 
of uneasiness. It is almost a symbolic act when you seemingly 
ignore the needs of a long-standing and steadfast tenant such 
as Somebody's Mother, Inc.;, Many of the tenants feel that in 
order to plan for a future they have to feel that there is a 
reliable, ongoing relationship that can be trusted. This is 
just one more way of underscoring that insecurity. It is the 
kind of attitude that keeps tenants from keeping their dollar 
investments in one place. 
We aren't just considering ourselves, but the Square as a 
whole. We would also think it was foolish to open another cook 
store or a sporting goods store. We can't, however, imagine 
having complaints about a department store that carried chil-
dren's clothing (unless they openly shopped our store for 
duplicating purposes--which we have continually fallen prey to 
since our conception). 
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We make no threats. We are aware that hard-nosed businessmen 
only gain momentum under threat but we wish for you to under • 
stand that we feel we have made a considerable Investment in 
Trolley Square and we feel that the the owners no longer have 
an investment in us. Our future plans considered Trolley 
Square as the focus of new ideas, This alters that sense 
greatly. We have had many offers since we have been in busi-
ness but we have felt that our major concern was with Trolley 
Square. We have used bard work and talent to gain our present 
status and we have had to convince people every step of the way 
that we knew what we were talking about. We have built a 
strong clientale that reaches far beyond the state borders. We 
feel that what Trolley offers us most is the tourist business 
and walk-ins. If this part our business has to be sliced up 
and shared with another shop we have to question 
whether we would be be nnr clientele and find a 
place with less overhead. 
We hope that we can alter your thinking concerning ,fKidfs Duds,f 
or at least help you delay making a decision at this time. We 
have paid our way. We cannot see the benefit to you of taking 
money out of our hands. We are just getting over the rough 
weather of our expansion and have been looking for some strong 
sailing. You certainly cannot blame us for our attitude about 
the new store and we hope you will allow further deliberation 
upon this matter. 
El a,! in,11 N l e i hi ii 
des 
September 18, 1985 
Trolley Square 
199 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attn: Max Pinegar 
Dear Max, 
We are very concerned because we haven't heard from you regarding our 
meeting on September 5, 1985, In that meeting we proposed a settle-
ment of between $12,000.00 and $15,000,00 for any back rent. Mary, 
Harold Hill (accountant), and I stated that this was the only realistic 
and fair assessment if we were to remain viable. 
The meeting ended with an agreement that you would respond with a 
decision the following Monday. We are very anxions to settle this 
matter so we can put this very difficult period at Trolley Square 
behind us. 
Even though we haven't heard from you we are submitting the enclosed 
rent payments, as agreed. We are acting in good faith. Please let 







cc: Harold Hill 
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Ms. Shirley Williams 
M.S. Management Associates, Inc. 
Merchants Plaza 
P.O. Box 7066 
Indianapolis, Indiana *6207 • 
RE: Somebody's Mother, 212 Trolley Square 
Dear Ms . Wil 1 iams : 
As you know we represent Somebody's Mother. I am pleased to 
report that in direct conversations between our client and Mr. 
Wallace Wright, an agreement has been reached regarding past 
rents through 3une 1986. The terms of the agreement with Mr. 
Wallace Wright can be summarized as follows: 
1. In lieu of past rents otherwise alleged to be due, our 
client Somebody's Mother, will be paying Mr. Wright 6% of total 
sales realized during the sale. Please find enclosed the sales 
and rental payment summaries for 1984, 1985, and the first six 
(6) months of 1986. You can see by reviewing these figures that 
6% of total sales equals $32,763.18. 
2. Half of this amount is to be paid in cash. 
3. Half of this amount is to be paid pursuant to a three 
(3) year promissory note which provides for monthly payments of 
interest (at 10%) and principal, principal to be amortized over a 
five (5) year period, with a balloon payment at the end of the 
third year. 
4. Upon the payment of the cash amount set forth above and 
the execution of the above described promissory note, Mr. Wallace 
Wright and Somebody's Mother will execute mutual general 
releases. 
As soon as you have had a chance to confirm this agreement 
with Mr. Wallace, we will prepare the promissory note and the 
LAW O F F I C E S 
G I P S O N H O F F M A N & P A N C I O N E 
A *#»OrCSStONAt CO«»OAATiON 
Ms* Shirley Williams 
April 14, 19&7 
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mutual general release. On behalf of our clients, we are pleased 
to have reached a resolution in regards to past disputes and we 
are looking foward to the future with renewed enthusiasm. 
Very truly yours, 
f<tat-
ROBERT E. GIPSON 
REG/ms/22 
Enclosures 
April 22, 1987 
Herb Simon 
Mel Simon and Associates 
115 W. Washington, Merchant's Plaza 
Indianapolis, IN 46204 
Dear Mr.* Simon, 
We request your immediate attention to avoid a losing situation for 
both you and us. Last week, we received a letter from Kathy Hinkley 
giving us an ultimatum to settle with Wally Wright or move out in 30 days. 
However, when we met with Mr. Wright, he said that it is out of his hands, 
that it is up to Mel Simon and Associates and Cordish Embry. 
WE ARE TRYING TO COMPLY 
The problem is an old debt accumulated during Trolley Squarefs difficult 




Several weeks ago we met with Mr. Wright and we agreed on a figure 
based on 6% of our sales for the months we did not pay rent. We 
prepared the figures (approximately $32,000) and submitted them to 
Mr. Wright. 
Then we received the letter from Ms. Hinkley. Shortly after that, 
Mr. Wright gave us a paper showing the figure at $60,000. We were 
shocked at the discrepancy between our figure and Mr. Wright's 
figure. At a subsequent meeting, we found Mr. Wright's figure vas 
based on 6Z of sales plus common area and related fees. The con-
dition of the square during the period in question in no way war-
ranted paying the almost $8/sq.ft. being charged for CAM etc. 
Because the previous owners of the square were in a financial crisis, 
the square was not promoted or maintained in the way it should have 
been. The image of the square was damaged severly and traffic vas 
very low. 
So. we met with Mr. Wright again# At this meeting, we reiterated 
our grievances and our options, which are limited. We explained 
that we couldn't survive with any debt over the $32,000. We told him 
that a figure above that will force us into bankruptcy or a lawsuit. 
We have exhausted all of our financial resources just to keep the 
business healty. We have gone without income for two years and mort-
gaged our houses. If Trolley Square was going to evict us, it should 
Q1Q TROU£Y SQUhRC 
801 531O048 
SNJ LM€ CITY UThH 
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Page 2 
it should have been when the debt was accumulating, but over and over 
again, management insisted that they wanted us in the square, and that 
everything could be worked out. Then, of course, the players kept changing. 
Mr. Wright agreed that we have an excellent business and he hoped we could 
weather the problems. However, Mr. Wright said, MIfd like to help you out 
but my hands are tied." 
DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT US? 
We have been in Trolley Square for 14 years. We have maintained a viable busi-
ness and a dedicated clientele. We have received national attention several 
times including being named one of the 10 best children's stores in America by 
"Shopping Center World" magazine. Please contact Muriel Stathis, from your 
company, and ask her about our store. She was full of praises, but not unfam-
iliar ones. She was so impressed that she took pictures to show the stores in 
her Texas mall. 
THE PROBLEMS CONTINUE, YET WE HAVE STRUGGLED ALONG 
Since Mel Simon and Asso. and Cordish Embry took over the square, we have con-
tinued to operate in good faith under ridiclous conditions. The construction 
has been very damaging to our business. Our entire corner is empty. We are 
totally isolated. Furthermore, we continue to suffer through: 
o Cut-off hallways 
o Extreme noise (e.g. jackhammers) 
o Continuous dust (coating all of our fixtures and merchandise) 
o Carbon monoxide from construction equipment 
o Being without heat in the winter and air conditioning in the summer 
We have had many customers leave because of the cold, the heat, the dust, or the 
noise. One woman left - irate - because she and her child got very dirty while 
trying on clothing (documentation can be provided). That particular day there 
was a backhoe operating in the space next to us which filled our store with black 
soot and carbon monoxide. 
In spite of our troubles, we have paid our rent since Mel Simon and Asso. and 
Cordish Embry took over. In the past two years, we have paid almost $50,000 in 
rent and fees. We are not a failing business, just a business looking for a 
chance to continue. We are trying to rectify the problems caused by the mis-
management of the past that could have sunk us. So, here we are again. Our op-
tions are limited. The only way we can avoid bankruptcy is to: 
o Have the debt reduced to a fair amount that we can realistically 
handle and still remain in business. 
o Go out of business and sue for damages. 
We submitted a more detailed history to Price-Waterhous, but when we met with 
Kathy Hinkley she had not seen it. While we understand it is advantageous to 




Finally, we are looking for positive solutions. Please carefully consider 
everything before you force us into a lose-lose situation. 
We looked forward to new ownership and new opportunity. We know the Salt Lake 
market and we know we can be a valuable asset to Trolley Square. Several 
people have suggested that they do not have the power to resolve these issues. 
We feel you do have the power. Before we are out of the square, we would love 





Somebody's Mother, Inc. 
212 Trolley Square 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Plaintifffs Exhibits 51, 52, and 53. I believe that you 
testified earlier that that document was prepared at your 
instructions. 
THE COURT: Counsel, when you say that document, 
you've alluded to 51, 52, and 53. 
MR. PERKINS: It's stapled together, Your Honor, 
I think is the reason- -
THE COURT: But stapled together, why is it 
marked as three different exhibits? 
MR. WEEKS: Just one of our further glitches with 
exhibits this morning, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well let's refer to them 
specifically, since they're marked differentially, and it 
appears, at this juncture, at least, they're not connected. 
At least I can't see a staple. In any event, let's refer 
to them separately. 
Q (BY MR. WEEKS) Did you have those documents 
prepared, Mr. Wright? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And by whom? 
A By the accounting department of Mel Simon and 
Associates. 
Q And for what purpose were they prepared? 
A To give a summary in order to discuss with the 
tenant, and for our own information, and perhaps the filing 
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of a lawsuit to collect the rents. It's a summary of all 
the rents due as they accrued, and the payments against 
those accounts payable. 
Q And what years do those three exhibits cover, 
Mr. Wright? 
A They cover 12-83 through 12-86. 
So they cover a three-year period? 
Yes. 







Yes, they do. 
And is that a cumulative setting forth of 
payments and charges? 
A Those are all the charges that were made during 
those three years, and all the payments that were made 
against those charges during those three years. 
Q Do you know where that information was generated 
from? 
A Yes, it was generated from the computer accounts 
that we kept at Trolley Square and at Indianapolis. When 
they took over, they merged our system with theirs and 
moved the accounting to Indianapolis. 
Q You testified earlier that you had your own 
accounting system prior to the Simon purchase. 
A That is correct. 
tr 
1 I Q And after that, when did they implement their 
2 I computer system? 
3 I A They came in and utilized ours, as I recall, 
4 I from sometime around May of f86 into the fall of '86, and 
5 I then they went to a different accounting system and merged 
6 our system into theirs, and removed the accounting to 
7 I Indianapolis in the fall of ! 86. 
8 j Q During all of those three years that are covered 
9 by those exhibits, 51, 52, and 53, did you have access upon 
10 request to accounting information out of Indianapolis? 
11 Strike that. Did you have access to accounting information 
12 during all of those three years? 
13 J A Yes, I did. We maintained a full accounting 
14 staff at Trolley Square. 
15 Q And after they went to Indianapolis, did you 
16 have to write to get accounting materials from them? 
17 A Yes, and I did. 
18 j Q Did you have occasion to meet with the 
19 on-premise accounting people at Trolley Square after the 
20 j Simon interest was purchased? 
21 | A Yes, they would have their people come on a 
22 | somewhat irregular basis, and we would discuss the 
23 | accounting at that time. 
24 I Q Were there some records kept at Trolley Square 
25 | with regard to payments? 
2C 
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1 J A The payment records were removed to Indianapolis 
2 I at some point in time. But it was done over a gradual 
3 basis in 1986 and 1987. 
4 I Q But you had an opportunity to review those 
5 I documents? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 I Q Have you had the opportunity to discuss those 
8 exhibits, 51, 52, and 53, with the preparer of the 
9 J documents? 
10 I A Yes, I have. They were prepared by the Shirley 
11 I Williams, who was the collection agent at M. S. Associates, 
12 Mel Simon Associates, that was in charge of Trolley Square 
13 I accounts. 
14 I Q I direct your attention to what has been marked 
15 J as Plaintifffs P-24, and ask you who prepared that 
16 document. 
17 THE COURT: Thatfs 24, counsel? 
18 MR. WEEKS: I'm sorry, 54. 
19 I THE WITNESS: Yes, I had them prepare that, just 
20 I to type it, which is nothing more than a summary of the 
21 | charges, interest, credits, and the balance, a running 
22 | balance just for ease of observation. 
23 | Q (BY MR. WEEKS) Is it verbatim from the earlier 
24 | schedules, 51, 52, and 53? 
25 I A It's verbatim, merely a summary. 
* N 
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1 I Q I direct your attention now to Plaintiff's P-55, 
2 I which you alluded to earlier, and ask you whether you had 
3 I occasion to discuss collections with Shirley Williams. 
4 J A Yes, I did. As has been mentioned before, they 
5 J had the right to make the collections. As part of that, 
6 their duty was to differentiate the amounts that were still 
7 owed to me from those that were now accruing for them. And 
8 J I asked them to inform Somebody's Mother of exactly what 
9 those amounts were, in the form of a summary, and that is 
10 J what 55 is. It's a letter to Somebody's Mother from the 
11 accounting department at Mel Simon Associates outlining the 
12 J delinquencies, and requesting payment for them. 
13 Q How many occasions did you talk to Shirley 
14 I Williams after the sale of the center until the present 
15 time? 
16 I A Certainly in the dozens, and it may get into the 
17 hundreds. 
18 I Q And did some of those conversations relate to 
19 the tenant Somebody's Mother? 
20 I A Yes, they did. 
21 Q Did she act under your instruction to send 
22 letters and collection materials as you requested? 
23 A Yes, she did. 
24 Q Did the TS1 partnership, the Simon partnership, 





























A Yes, they did. They hired the law firm of 
Cohne, Rappaport and Segal, and they also sent letters and 
undertook collection efforts. 
Q What was your role in the collection efforts 
rendered by that law firm? 
A Just that I directed them to collect on my 
behalf the amounts that were owed to me, and I believe they 
were also collecting at that time the amounts that were 
owed to Simon independent of what was owed to me. 
Q So you had occasion- - They were your 
attorneys, in effect? 
A They were my attorneys, yes. 
Q I refer you to Plaintiff's P-56, Mr. Wright, and 
ask you if you can tell me about that document. 
A Well, this is a letter sent on December 2nd, 
1987 to Elaine Nielson and Mary Whitesides by John Nelson, 
who is my attorney at Cohne, Rappaport and Segal, and said 
that he had, during their meeting, evidently he'd had a 
meeting with Nielson and Whitesides stating that he had 
provided all the ledger sheets from Trolley Square, and 
asked them to return any itemized explanation, if there was 
any inaccuracies in the amounts due. 
Q Did you discuss that letter with Mr. Nelson? 
A Yes, I did. 
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Q Did you have him send it? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Do you know, were there any messages 
communicated to you concerning any disputes about those 
ledger sheets? 
A There was no disputes. In fact they did not 
respond with the information that he asked. He asked if 
there was any discrepancies- -
MR. PERKINS: I'm going to object to this 
testimony, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just one moment, please, Mr. Wright. 
MR. PERKINS: I think this witness is testifying 
about information that's beyond his knowledge as far as 
he's testifying as to what the defendants did with regard 
to any letter from Mr. Nelson. I don't think he's a 
competent witness, and I object to it. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to sustain it on 
the basis of competency. But as to speculating about 
others' states of mind and as to hearsay, I'll sustain the 
objection. 
Q (BY MR. WEEKS) Was any information ever given 
to you by Mr. Nelson showing discrepancies in your 
accounting records on- -




1 Q (BY MR. WEEKS) Was any information ever given 
2 to you by Mr. Nelson with regard to discrepancies on your 
3 accounting records on the Somebody's Mother account? 
4 I A It was not. 
5 1 Q Mr. Wright, you indicated you'd been affiliated 
6 with Trolley Square for a number of years. Could you give 
7 a very brief history of the development of Trolley Square? 
8 A Yes, I purchased the property, along with a 
9 partner from the National City Alliance in November of 1969 
10 after having seen a similar project near Ghirardelli Square 
11 J in San Francisco, and felt these buildings would make a 
12 suitable development at that time. 
13 After acquiring it, it took us some time to get 
14 J possession and finish the plans, and then in about 1971 we 
15 opened with our first tenants, I think it was a gas station 
16 and an ice cream store. And then that was followed by 
17 theaters. And basically we just took one bay at a time, 
18 and then as we'd finish that and get tenants in it, we'd go 
19 J back to the bank and they'd give us some money, and we'd go 
20 I to the next one. I didn't know you couldn't do it that 
21 I way, so that's the way I did it. 
22 | And Trolley Square's been an ongoing project. To 
23 | this day we are still doing construction for new tenants in 
24 I portions of the building that either had not been remodeled 
25 | or are not adequately remodeled. 
/ # / 
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1 Q is Trolley Square different in any material 
2 regard from a mall like Crossroads Mall? 
3 I A Yes, quite a bit. Typically a mall would be 
4 I done by a large developer who has, in his basket, tenants 
5 that he can bring with him. And they would strike a deal 
6 and they would have probably 80 percent of it pre-leased 
7 prior to construction. And then it would all be done at 
8 J once, and within twenty-four months the project would be 
9 complete, the tenants would move in, and it would open. 
10 And then there would be the type of thing Ifm 
11 talking about, of turnover, and it would be just like down 
12 at ZCMI today, you'll see construction ongoing. And 
13 Trolley Square has to have that ongoing thing, too. But 
14 ours was done a bit at a time. Most malls are done all at 
15 once. 
16 MR. WEEKS: I would move again at this time, Your 
17 Honor, for admission of Exhibits 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, and 
18 56. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Perkins? 
20 MR. PERKINS: Starting with 54? 
21 MR. WEEKS: Starting with 51. 
22 THE COURT: Do you have any objection to 51 being 
23 I received? 
24 MR. PERKINS: The same objection, Your Honor. 




























documents kept in the regular course of business. Whoever 
prepared them isn't here so we can cross examine them about 
what is used to prepare these. 
There's been testimony that they had a computer 
programmed accounting system that should have been able to 
give them a computer readout as to anything they wanted. I 
don't think it's credible evidence. 
THE COURT: As to 51, 52, and 53, will you 
respond to that, Mr. Weeks? 
MR. WEEKS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe that Mr. 
Wright has testified that this information came from the 
computer records of Trolley Square, and that also part of 
it came from the computer records of TS1 out of 
Indianapolis. 
THE COURT: I never heard any testimony about 
these records being kept in the ordinary course of 
business. In fact these, as I understand it, are 
summaries. 
MR. WEEKS: That's correct, Your Honor. They are 
summaries taken from the computer billing records. 
THE COURT: Well, if there's testimony that they 
were kept in the ordinary course of business, made in the 
ordinary course of business, then I suppose they could come 
in as a business record. Absent that, I think Mr. Perkins' 
objection is well taken. 
it* 
1 I MR. WEEKS: Let me ask a couple of questions. 
2 | Q (BY MR. WEEKS) Mr. Wright, is it normal in the 
3 | course of the accounting records of Trolley Square to keep 
4 I rent records on a cumulative basis? 
5 I A Yes, it is. 
6 I Q And does that mean that as each month passes you 
7 I apply credits to the account, and also apply charges? 
8 J A That's correct. That is as was shown on Exhibit 
9 49, for instance. 
10 Q Thatfs the monthly statement. 
11 A That's the monthly statement. It also shows the 
12 application of credits. 
13 Q And those records are kept in the ordinary 
14 J course of business? 
15 A Yes, they are. 
16 Q And for whose benefit are those records kept? 
17 A For the benefit of Trolley Square management. 
18 Q And anyone else? 
19 A The tenant. 
20 J Q And are those records made accessible to both 
21 I the tenant and to the management of Trolley Square? 
22 | A Yes, they are. 
23 | Q And is it true that you have personal knowledge 
24 I that that is, in fact, true, that those records were so 



























A Those records were maintained that way. 
Q And were they also made available to any parties 
that were interested? 
A Yes, they have been, and these records have been 
furnished these tenants. 
Q Mr. Wright, after the purchase of the square by 
the TSl Partnership, which was Simon, you continued to be a 
partner in that partnership? 
A That is correct. 
Q And how frequently since July of 1986 have you 
continued to meet with the TSl Partnership partners? 
A I meet with their manager on a regular basis, at 
least weekly. 
Q And what records do you have occasion to review 
with that manager? 
A I have tenant records specifically. I also get 
from their accounting department quarterly a summary of all 
the activity at Trolley Square in terms of gross sales and 
receipts and mortgage payment. A complete financial 
statement and balance sheet quarterly and yearly. 
Q And after the purchase of the square in July of 
1986, did you have access to those same accounting and rent 
records regarding Somebody's Mother? 
A Yes, I did, and this was the summary that I 




























Q Now, when they started keeping records in 
Indianapolis, do copies, or some printed form of those 
accounting records come back to Salt Lake City? 
A On request. 
Q To whom do they come back? 
A In this instance, they came back to me, as a 
partner I requested them. Normally they'd come back to the 
manager who had requested them. 
THE COURT: At this time I'm going to receive 51, 
52, and 53. I believe adequate foundation has been laid to 
receive them as business records. 
MR. PERKINS: May I address that, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PERKINS: I think this testimony has added 
nothing to what we've already heard. It has established 
that this is not a record that was kept in the ordinary 
course of business. There's still no testimony that we 
know who, in fact, prepared that, whoever that person was 
is not here to testify that this is an accurate summary of 
records that that person .has and maintains and has custody 
of. 
THE COURT: Fifty-one, 52, and 53 are received. 
(WHEREUPON Exhibits Numbers 51, 52, and 53 were 
received into evidence.) 
THE COURT: As to 54, Mr. Perkins, do you have 
Ut 
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1 I any objection? 
2 1 MR. PERKINS: Same objections, Your Honor. Since 
3 this apparently was prepared from the one I've objected to, 
4 51, two, and three. Again, we don't know who prepared this 
5 I document. That person is not here to testify as to the 
6 I authenticity or accuracy of it. 
7 THE COURT: I believe we were told who prepared 
8 it. It was prepared by a Shirley Williams, as I understand 
9 it. 
10 MR. PERKINS: That wasn't my understanding. 
11 MR. WEEKS: That's what he testified. 
12 MR. PERKINS: But she's not here so we can 
13 I examine her. There's been no testimony that this is a 
14 regular, or a record kept in the ordinary course of 
15 I business. If it is prepared from 51, two, and three, it's 
16 obviously not, because it was acknowledged that those were 
17 not kept in the ordinary course of business. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Perkins, I don't think that's 
19 been acknowledged at all. In fact, the way I heard the 
20 I testimony was that 51, 52, and 53 were kept in the ordinary 
21 course of business. I heard Mr. Wright say that. Do you 
22 have any other objections to Exhibit 54? 
23 MR. PERKINS: Only that I heard him say that this 
24 document was prepared for this proceeding, which means it's 
25 not kept in the ordinary course of business. 
UH 
